Risk assessments are used by the police in order to identify the need for victim protection. The aim of this study was to examine the inter-rater reliability of two violence risk assessment tools; the Police Screening Tool for Violent Crimes (PST-VC) and the Brief Spousal Assault Form for the Evaluation of Risk (B-SAFER), used by police employees in two different police authorities in Sweden. The inter-rater agreement was evaluated for both tools, with respect to global risk assessments, recommended protective actions and risk-and victim vulnerability factors. The main results showed that the inter-rater agreement was highest for the global assessments and widely varying, from very low to fairly high, for the structured variables. The fairly high reliability for the global risk assessments was most likely due to shared assumptions (heuristics, tacit knowledge) among the assessors rather than being based on the information obtained by the tools.
INTRODUCTION
Violence risk assessment tools have been used in the Swedish police organization since the late 1990s (National Swedish Police Board, 2010) . Their use began with the introduction of an intimate partner violence (IPV) risk assessment tool, the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment guide (SARA; Kropp, Hart, Webster & Eaves, 1994 , 1999 , in a couple of police authorities. Thereafter, a number of other tools have been introduced in more or less all Swedish police authorities. Most of these tools are variants of structured instruments developed in the forensic psychiatric context (e.g. SARA). In addition, there is a general violence risk assessment tool denoted the Police Screening Tool for Violent Crimes (PST-VC), which has been designed at one of Sweden's regional police authorities. This tool is different, in that it assigns more weight to subjective judgements than the structured instruments.
The number of studies regarding violence risk assessment and management in police settings has increased in the recent years. For instance, areas of interest have been the applicability of psychiatric tools in police settings (e.g. Belfrage & Strand, 2009; Kropp, 2008; Kropp & Hart, 2004; ; the development/adaptation of assessment tools (e.g. Belfrage, 2008; Belfrage & Strand, 2008; Belfrage, Strand, Ekman & Hasselborg, 2012; Dayan, Fox & Morag, 2013) ; the predictive validity of IPV assessments (e.g. Belfrage & Strand, 2012; Belfrage et al., 2012a; Storey, Kropp, Hart, Belfrage & Strand, 2014) ; police officers' decision making in the risk assessment and management procedure (e.g. Robinson, Pinchevsky & Guthrie, 2016; Trujillo & Ross, 2008) , and the inter-rater reliability/consistency of police officers risk assessments (e.g. Sebire & Barling, 2016) .
The main findings of these studies can be summarized in the following statements. The majority of risk-and victim vulnerability factors employed in various assessment tools are useful in police settings, in particular in male offender samples (Belfrage, 2008; Belfrage & Strand, 2008 , 2009 ). However, police officers have difficulty assessing psychiatric risk factors, because information regarding these factors is difficult to access and police officers in general lack training in psychiatry (Belfrage, 2008) . This was one of the problems that motivated the development of the Brief Spousal Assault Form for the Evaluation of Risk (B-SAFER; Kropp, Hart & Belfrage, 2005 , which is a police version of the SARA guide (see Belfrage, 2008 and Kropp, 2008) . Another assessment tool developed to guide professionals in the law enforcement and social authorities is the PATRIARCH (Belfrage, 2005) . It is a structured instrument, like the SARA and the B-SAFER, and focuses on the assessment of honor-based crime (see Belfrage et al., 2012b) . Studies on risk assessment and management in female offender samples are still limited. However, a recent study examined police officers' use of the B-SAFER instrument in a female offender sample 1 ). Some of the B-SAFER factors were found to be useful in assessing female IPV offenders, but there seem to be some gender-related factors also, that are not included in the tool. Additional studies are required to identify these factors.
1. Storey and Strand (2012b) have also conducted a study aiming to describe characteristics of female IPV offenders and male IPV victims, as well as risk management strategies recommended by the police. In approximately half the sample, the violence risk was assessed using the B-SAFER and in the other half the SARA was used. The B-SAFER sample was the same as in Storey and Strand (2012a) , except that there were two additional cases included in the sample in Storey and Strand (2012b) .
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Further, the number of risk factors/the total score of the risk factors has been found to be positively associated with the summarized risk assessment (Belfrage et al., 2012a; Kropp & Hart, 2004; Storey et al., 2014) . A relationship between the summarized risk assessment and recommended protective actions has also been found in a number of studies. Taken together, these studies show that a higher number/level of protective actions or specific protective actions are more often recommended in cases assessed as being high risk (Belfrage & Strand, 2012; Belfrage et al., 2012a; Kropp, 2008; Storey et al., 2014) . The predictive validity of IPV assessments was found to be low to moderate, which was mainly thought to be a consequence of effective protective actions preventing repeat IPV in high-risk cases (Belfrage & Strand, 2012; Belfrage et al., 2012a; Storey et al., 2014) . However, Trujillo and Ross (2008) found police officers to be biased in their summarized IPV risk assessments. They also found, in line with Robinson et al. (2016) that police officers tend to put the greatest emphasis on a small number of risk factors in their assessments. This suggests that the poor predictive accuracy might also be due to the quality of the summarized risk assessments themselves, and thus not merely a result of the effect of interventions. Some other possible reasons for the low accuracy, such as an underestimation of the risk, are also addressed in Belfrage and Strand (2012) .
Moreover, it has been found that there is a relationship between the inter-rater agreement and the predictive validity of violence risk assessments (McNeil, Lam & Binder, 2000) . Clinical assessments administered by nurses at a short-term psychiatric inpatient unit were compared with assessments administered by physicians. The cases were also followed up in terms of violent behavior. The main results showed that predictive validity was higher in cases in which the nurse and the physician agreed on the level of risk. In line with these results, Kropp and Hart (2000) state the importance of a high inter-rater agreement as follows: "If raters cannot agree on the presence of individual risk factors or the implications that can be drawn from them, there is little point in conducting risk assessments" (p. 109).
According to the National Swedish Police Board (2010), inter-rater agreement and the quality of risk assessments conducted in police settings increase with the use of assessment tools, which thus creates a firmer foundation for the recommendation of protective actions across different cases. This assumption is not motivated by any results from previous studies and to our knowledge, it has not yet been tested in a police setting. However, the stability of police officers' SARA, B-SAFER and DASH (Domestic Abuse, Stalking, Harassment and Honor-Based Violence) ratings has been studied previously (Belfrage et al., 2012a; Storey et al., 2014; Sebire & Barling, 2016) . In the first two studies, the first and the second assessment in cases of repeat IPV were compared. The stability of the total score of the risk assessment was high (ICC= .76 2 in both studies) and for the global risk assessment it was fair in the first study (SARA, ICC= .45) and low in the second study (B-SAFER, ICC= .32). Both measures increased over time and the changes were statistically significant. Belfrage et al. (2012a) also measured the stability of the police officers' assessments of items related to symptoms of mental disorder (recent suicidal or homicidal ideation/intent, recent psychotic and/or manic symptoms and personality disorder with anger, impulsivity, or behavioral instability), and 2. According to Ciccetti and Sparrow (1981) , a reliability coefficient between .60-.74 indicates the clinical significance to be good, while a coefficient in the ranges .75-1.00 indicates the clinical significance to be excellent. found the ICC coefficients (.56, .68, and .59 ) to be of moderate size. The stability of 38 specialist investigating police officers' domestic violence risk assessments using the DASH risk assessment tool was recently examined (Sebire & Barling, 2016) . All participants assessed the risk (low, medium or high) in four cases at two different points in time. Between the two occasions, the participants were reminded of the national risk grading definitions. The consistency of the first-time risk assessments was weak (ICC= .182, p < .05). The second assessments were somewhat more consistent (ICC= .283, p < .001). Further, 66 percent of the police officers' assessments were similar at the two occasions. Officers working in areas with a comparatively high rate of domestic violence cases more often used lower risk steps in their assessments compared to officers working in areas with a lower rate of such cases. The current risk assessment tradition dates back to the new conception of psychopathy advanced by Hare and Schalling (1978) , and the construction of a psychopathy checklist (Levander, 1979) . Such a checklist was used in the 1980s (the Penetanguishene project) as part of the VRAG risk assessment instrument (Harris, Rice & Quinsey, 1993) , which outperformed contemporary actuarial risk assessment instruments with respect to predictive accuracy. Most of the follow-up work of this ground-breaking study was done in North American correctional settings, by psychologists/behavioral scientists. HCR-20 (Webster, Eaves, Douglas & Wintrup, 1995) marks the beginning of the current generation of risk assessments, the items of which are strongly loaded with psychopathy-related personality/ behavioral factors. Used in correctional settings by properly educated and trained staff, the inter-rater reliability is impressive (around .90). Kropp and Hart (2000) , for example, compared IPV assessments (SARA; Kropp et al., 1994 Kropp et al., , 1995 Kropp et al., , 1999 conducted by staff from correctional settings with assessments conducted by a clinical psychologist. The clinical significance of the SARA total score was good to excellent (the total score, ICC= .84, Part 1, ICC= .68 and Part 2, ICC= .87). The inter-rater reliability for the summary risk assessment was somewhat lower (ICC= .63). Grann and Wedin (2002) presented similar results in a study in which the SARA instrument was used in an actuarial manner by a B.A.-level psychology student and a psychology researcher. In this case, however, the intra-class correlation score for part 1 of the instrument was higher than that for part 2 (total score, ICC= .85, Part 1, ICC= .88 and Part 2, ICC= .74). Finally, a violence risk assessment tool called the Spouse Violence Risk Assessment Inventory (SVRA-I) was recently evaluated (Dayan et al., 2013) . As a part of the evaluation, the inter-rater reliability was examined, including 19 cases assessed by one investigator and two psychology graduate students per case. Assessments conducted by the students were compared both to each other and to the assessments conducted by investigators (correlations were computed). The results were fair (r= .68, .73 and .75 (p < .01) .
Given these results and the police authorities' duty to prevent violence and protect victims, the use of violence risk assessment and management methods in police settings is reasonable. The fact that these methods were implemented widely in the Swedish police organization without being fully tested in this specific context may be questioned. Thus, in the present study we aim to fill this knowledge gap by examining two violence risk assessment tools used in the Swedish police, the B-SAFER and the PST-VC. The first one is the tool that is used to the greatest extent among Swedish police, and the latter differs from this and most other tools used by the police, in that it is a general tool, allows more weight for This article is downloaded from www.idunn.no. © 2017 Author(s). This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC-BY-NC 4.0 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). subjective judgements and is developed by police employees. The tools will be evaluated separately with some comparisons when possible.
The present study is based on a broader evaluation regarding the use of violence risk assessment tools in the Swedish police authority, which was conducted on behalf of the National Swedish Police Board between the years 2012 and 2014. 3 The overall aim of the evaluation was to examine police employees' use of violence risk assessment tools and particularly whether these tools can be useful in identifying high-risk cases for repeat crime, and if different assessors examine the same cases coherently. All empirical data used in this study was collected for the evaluation.
AIMS
The main aim of this study was to examine the inter-rater reliability of the Police Screening Tool for Violent Crimes (PST-VC) and the Brief Spousal Assault Form for the Evaluation of Risk (B-SAFER), as used by police employees in two different police authorities in Sweden.
3. METHODS 3.1. The Police Screening Tool for Violent Crimes (PST-VC) The PST-VC was designed at one of Sweden's regional police authorities, and is used to assess all types of cases (e.g. intimate partner violence, honor-based violence and stalking) that are identified as high risk on the basis of the initial police report. The PST-VC is structured on the basis of a number of headings under which important risk/vulnerability and contextual factors should be noted. In order to help the assessor to choose which risk-and victim vulnerability factors to include in the assessment, there is a guideline with questions: e.g. Does the suspected offender has access to weapons? The main sources of information used by the assessor are police records, police reports and information provided by the victim. However, speaking to victims is not mandatory. The assessor decides on how to collect information in each individual case. In the second part of the assessment, a global risk assessment is conducted, based on the information collected and the assessor's experiencebased judgment (tacit knowledge, see Polanyi, 1983) . The PST-VC risk scale ranges from no risk (1) to high risk (5). As a part of the risk assessment and management procedure, the assessor is required to recommend interventions 4 to address the risks identified.
Procedure
Seventeen cases were evaluated by ten police employees 5 . The majority of these were trained police officers. Hereafter we refer to these individuals as police employees or asses-3. The results of the evaluation are presented in five reports (Mellgren, Svalin, Levander & Torstensson Levander, 2012 , 2014a , 2014b Mellgren, Svalin, Torstensson Levander & Levander, 2014c; Svalin, Mellgren, Torstensson Levander & Levander, 2014) . 4. The police are responsible for the implementation of some of the protective measures that they recommend (e.g., conducting safety dialogues with victims and providing safety alarms) while others are the responsibility of other actorsrestraining orders are granted by prosecutors, for example. However, the primary responsibility for implementing protective measures and providing support to the victims of crime lies with the municipalities (SFS 2001:453). 5. These individuals each assessed between one and five cases. sors. The level of training regarding violence risk assessment and management among the assessors was overall low.
Each case was evaluated by two assessors who were paired at random and were blind to one another's assessments. All cases 6 were authentic cases and had therefore been assessed previously, at the time of the initial police report, thus producing a total of 51 PST-VC assessments. In order to avoid the assessors becoming aware of, e.g. repeat victimization, they were instructed to use only information from the period prior to a specified date. Another difference in the new assessments compared to the original assessments was that the assessors did not have the possibility to collect information by speaking to victims. However, since the assessors did not list which sources of information they used, neither in the original nor in the new assessments, we do not know to which extent victims were contacted originally. But it seems that contacting victims was rare, since answers to those variables included in this study (described below) were mainly based on information found in police reports and records. Otherwise, the new assessments were conducted according to the assessors' normal assessment routines. The new assessments (Assessors 1 and 2) were compared both to each other and to the original assessment (Assessor 3).
All of the cases related to threats and/or violence (e.g. intimate partner violence, honorbased violence and gang-related violence). In five cases, more than one offender 7 was involved and in one case, there was more than one victim. However, only one offender and victim per case were included in the study data (either the offender/victim first mentioned in the assessment or a key victim/offender, if identified). In all but one case, the offenders were men.
8 Their ages at the time of the risk assessment varied between 15 and 64 (mean age: 29). The age of the victims varied between 17 and 98 (mean age: 32). Ten of the victims were men, seven were women.
Variables
The raw data of 51 PST-VC assessments were coded by the first author (KS) using SPSS (version 23). At first, nine risk-and seven victim vulnerability factors were identified for examination (see Table 1 ), on the basis of the PST-VC guidelines. All factors except threats and/or violence were coded as either present, absent or missing. Factors with more than 50 percent missing values were excluded from further analysis. Finally, the inter-rater agreement was examined for five offender risk factors: access to weapons, previous violence, previous offences other than violence, threats and/or violence against the victim and social problems; and for three victim vulnerability factors: fear of the offender, violence and offences other than violence.
6. The cases were selected by the police. A comparison with a larger PST-VC sample (see Mellgren, Svalin, Torstensson Levander & Levander, 2012) showed the distribution of risk levels in the cases selected for the current study to be fairly similar. Original cases: risk level 1 (n=4), 2 (n=7), 3 (n=4), 4 (n=2), 5 (n=0). 7. Both the PST-VC and the B-SAFER assessments were conducted prior to a possible court hearing, which means that the offenders were suspected offenders. We nonetheless refer to them as offenders in this study. 8. In one case the offender was not identified by the police. The offenders' previous violence and offences other than violence, as well as the victims' violence and offences other than violence were coded as present/absent based on the information from police reports included in the assessment. If neither the presence nor absence of previous offences was mentioned, the item was considered missing. In some of the cases, it was noted that the victim had been registered by the police, but not for what type of offence. In these cases, we coded "missing" on violence and "present" on offences other than violence. The offenders' previous threats and violence against the victim included both previous incidents and the current incident, which meant that threats and/or violence had occurred in all cases. We coded this item on the basis of three categories; "threats", "violence" or "threats and violence". The offenders were considered to have access to weapons if such information was mentioned in the assessment. A "no" was coded if access to weapons was not mentioned in the assessment (and police records had been searched). The item was coded as "missing" if there was no information on access to weapons in the assessment and the police records had not been searched. Offender social problems included various kinds of problems: antisocial peers, family problems and homelessness. If any of these problems were mentioned in the assessment, the factor was considered present, and vice versa; if there was information stating these factors not to be problematic, a "no" was coded. In cases which lacked any information of this kind, the item was considered missing. The same principle was applied when coding whether or not the victim feared the offender.
The risk level (1-5), and the level of recommended protective actions were also examined. For both data sets, the protective actions were divided into three categories of protective actions, on the basis of the type of action: (1) information/support (contact with a victim support agency, the social services, a police employee, forward a case to the personal security group at the police and victim information) (2) victim protective actions (contact a victim shelter, protect identity of victim, provide an alarm, safety inspection of victim's home and security and/or victim support talk with a police employee) (3) offender prevention actions (applying for a restraining order and offender dialogue with a police employee). However, not all actions were recommended by police employees in both settings. If a combination of protective actions from different categories were recommended, this was noted in the coding procedure.
In addition to the standardized information supplied to all victims, the information/ support category included contacts with different types of victim support staff or authorities. In the PST-VC sample, there was a small number of high-risk cases in which a recommendation was made for the case to be forwarded to a personal security group within the police for further investigation. This action was also classified under the heading information/support. The other two protective action categories included actions more directly focused on either the victim (e.g. safety inspection of the victim's home) or the offender (e.g. an offender dialogue with a police officer). Protective actions were recommended in all assessments, but we have no information on whether they were implemented. In order to control for bias, we summed the scores of the risk-and victim vulnerability factors in all cases, and compared the means of Assessors 1, 2 and 3. All factors that were present were coded 2, absent factors were coded 0 and missing values 1. Due to the open structure of the PST-VC, it is not known whether a missing value in the PST-VC means that a specific item is not present in the actual case or whether it has been missed because the assessor for some other reason decided not to include it in the assessment. This was why we coded missing values with the middle option (1). The alternative proceeding was to use listwise deletion. However, due to the high rate of missing cases a large amount of the data would then have been excluded from the analyses.
The Brief Spousal Assault Form for the Evaluation of Risk (B-SAFER)
The B-SAFER instrument (Kropp et al., 2005 (Kropp et al., , 2010 was developed (based on the SARA guidelines) for the assessment and management of IPV risk in police settings, and consists of a checklist comprising ten offender risk factors and five victim vulnerability factors (see Table 2 ). On the basis of information from multiple sources: police reports, police records and information from the victim, the offender, witnesses if any, and the victims' relatives. Each factor is assessed as either "present", "partly present", "not present" or as impossible to assess due to a "lack of information". The risk factors are assessed based on both the current situation (the last four weeks) and the background (before the last four weeks) to the cases. Case-specific factors should also be included in the assessment. Finally, all the information, together with the assessor's professional judgment, is summarized into a global risk assessment. Both the risk of severe/fatal violence, imminent/acute violence and continued violence are assessed on a three-level risk scale; "low", "medium" or "high". The second part of the assessment procedure involves the formulation of a risk management plan.
Procedure
Three police employees who had been hired to conduct violence risk assessments at a Swedish police department conducted the B-SAFER assessments. Altogether they conducted 23 pairwise B-SAFER-assessments 9 of cases that were about to be evaluated in the context of their everyday work. Thus, in these cases there was an original assessment (Assessor 2) and one additional assessment (Assessor 1). All possible pairs of assessors were represented: the first pair conducted six pairwise assessments, the second pair eight, and the third pair nine assessments. The original cases had all been identified as high-risk cases by a screening procedure conducted at the time of police report. The B-SAFER risk factors were assessed both in the current situation and in terms of the background to the case, 10 but as a result of a high rate of missing values in the background assessments (48-87% in the original assessments) these were not included in further analyses.
The global risk scale used by the assessors in this study differed somewhat from the original B-SAFER manual, in terms of both the definition of risk and the nature of the scale employed; both the likelihood and the severity of IPV was assessed on a 5-point Likert scale.
11 Another difference was that the police authority under study had decided that the assessors should not speak to victims prior to assessing the risk, because they did not want the assessments to be influenced by the victims. Thus, just as the new PST-VC assessments, the B-SAFER assessments were mainly based on information found in police reports and records. Further, the cases were coded according to the directions contained in the B-SAFER manual (Kropp et al., 2005 (Kropp et al., , 2010 : present (2), partly present (1), not present (0). In addition to these coding options, we included missing values in the analysis of percentage agreement, but not in the correlations (the analytical strategy is described in more detail below). The B-SAFER assessments (N=46) were coded by the second author (CM) using SPSS (version 23). In the same way as with the PST-VC, the means of the B-SAFER total scores were compared to control for bias.
9. The distribution of risk levels in the cases: IPV likelihood: 1 (n=7), 2 (n=10), 3 (n=5), 4 (n=1). IPV Severity: 1 (n=3), 2 (n=16), 3 (n=4). The distribution of risk levels was compared to a larger sample of B-SAFER assessments conducted at the same police department (see Svalin, Mellgren, Levander & Torstensson Levander, 2014) . The risk levels of IPV severity were similar to the larger sample, whereas the cases in this study were assessed as having somewhat lower levels of IPV likelihood. 10. The victim vulnerability factors were only assessed in the current situation.
1= (low risk/no threat) -5= (high risk/significant threat).
Table 2. Presence of offender risk-and victim vulnerability factors in the B-SAFER (N=46). Percent (frequency).
Note: B-SAFER, Brief Spousal Assault Form for the Evaluation of Risk (Kropp, Hart, & Belfrage, 2005 .
Analysis
The pairwise assessments were compared by computing correlations (Kendall's tau, see Kendall, 1938 ) and percentage agreement for each risk factor, the global assessments and the recommended protective actions. The Kendall's tau was chosen as the statistical method because it is the most powerful and robust non-parametric bivariate correlation statistic (Winer, 1962) . The results of the percentage agreement analysis should be interpreted with caution, since the agreement that would be expected on the basis of chance is not taken into account and the level of agreement is therefore overestimated (Hallgren, 2012) . Paired sample t-tests were conducted in order to control for bias in both datasets (t-tests are robust vs. violations of normality, Winer, 1962) . We prefer to go safe because of doubts concerning whether requirements for an analysis of variance (ICC) was fulfilled. All analysis was computed in SPSS.
The study was approved by the Ethical Review Board in south Sweden. The assessors consented to participate in the study. Only the authors had access to data, which was stored in a safe. (8) 28 (13) 15 (7) 8. Employment problems 28 (13) 2 (1) 46 (21) 24 (11) 9. Substance use problems 37 (17) 24 (11) 24 (11) 15 (7) 10. Mental health problems 9 (4) 4 (2) 35 (16) 52 (24) Victim vulnerability factors 11. Inconsistent behavior and/or attitude toward perpetrator 37 (17) 15 (7) 37 (17) 11 (5) 12. Extreme fear of perpetrator 17 (8) 26 (12) 52 (24) 4 (2) 13. Inadequate access to resources Table 3 , and the correlations are presented in Table 4 . The inter-rater agreement for the global risk assessments was moderate to high. Assessor 1 and Assessor 2 agreed in 59 percent of the cases (10/17). The agreement between Assessors 1 and 2 and the original assessment (Assessor 3) was even higher; here the different assessors arrived at the same risk level in 82 and 76 percent of the cases respectively (14 and 13/17). In those cases where the assessors did not agree on the global risk assessment, the size of the difference was a single risk level. In all cases but two, the assessors specified risk levels 1/2 or 2/3. The level of agreement regarding previous violence and other criminal behavior varied across the assessment pairs. Compared to the other factors, the assessment pairs agreed to a relatively large extent as to whether there was information regarding previous offences (other than violence). On the other hand, there were no significant correlations with regard to this item. The evaluations of Assessors 1 and 3 and of Assessors 2 and 3 with regard to the offenders' previous violence correlated significantly (τ = .67 and .66) . However, in some cases one of the assessors rated previous violence to have occurred while the other assessor did not.
The level of agreement regarding threats and/or violence against the victim was equally high for all pairs. This risk factor was coded as "violence", "threats" and "violence and threats", with the current incident included. Thus, there were no missing values. Some assessors only included the most serious offence, violence, in cases of both threats and violence, which may explain the differences that were nonetheless identified.
Assessors 2 and 3 were relatively coherent in their assessments of both the offenders' social problems and the victims' fear of the offender, whereas the other assessment pairs did not agree to the same extent. It should be noted that in approximately half of the cases, the assessors agreed that there was not enough information available. For the items victims' violence and offences other than violence, we evaluated whether the assessors reported whether the victim had criminal records. All assessment pairs agreed in 53 percent of the cases (9/17) regarding the victims' violence and in 53 and 47 percent of the cases respectively (9 and 8/ 17), regarding offences other than violence. However, the assessment pairs did not agree to the same extent as to whether there was information present on which these assessments could be based. They agreed in less than 30 percent of the cases (0-5/17) for these two items.
Assessors 1 and 2 and Assessors 1 and 3 agreed on recommended protective actions in 59 percent of the cases (10/17). Assessors 2 and 3 agreed in 41 percent of the cases (7/17). Both Assessor 1 and Assessor 2 recommended more protective actions than Assessor 3 (the original assessment). This can probably be explained by the limited police resources available for protective actions and differences in the level of access to information (Assessor 3 had the opportunity to contact the victim to discuss the need for protective actions).
In summary, the inter-rater agreement was moderate to high for the global risk assessments. For the offender risk factors, it was highest for previous violence (with the exception of the level of agreement between Assessors 1 and 2) and threats and/or violence against the victim. All psychosocial factors except the offenders' social problems had too many missing values to be included in the analyses. Further, the victim vulnerability factors had a high rate of missing values and for those factors that were included, the inter-This article is downloaded from www.idunn.no. © 2017 Author(s). This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC-BY-NC 4.0 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). rater agreement was low overall (with the exception of the level of agreement between Assessors 2 and 3 regarding the victim's fear of the offender). The agreement for the recommended protective actions was also low. Table 3 . Percentage agreement among the PST-VC assessments in ten police employees in a Swedish police setting (Pairs=17). Table 4 . Kendall's tau-b for PST-VC assessments in ten police employees in a Swedish police setting (Pairs=17). *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ns= not significant. 
The B-SAFER
The percentage agreement results for the B-SAFER are presented in Table 5 and the correlations are presented in Table 6 . Overall, the level of agreement was highest for the global assessments; agreement varied between 70 and 83 percent of the cases respectively (16 and 19/23). The correlations for both the likelihood-and the severity of risk was good (τ = .72 and .69). In cases where the risk assessments differed, levels 1/2 and 2/3 were specified in all but one case. The percentage agreement for offender risk factors varied between 22-96 percent, with the lowest level of agreement being found for intimate relationship problems and mental health problems and the highest for violations of court orders. This latter finding was probably due to the fact that few of the offenders had been subjected to court orders; in 96 percent of the cases (22/23) both the assessors had rated this factor as a "no". The inter-rater agreement was satisfactory for the assessments of violent threats and thoughts and for item 3 "escalation" it was fair. No significant correlations were found in relation to either the assessments of the offenders' previous violent acts or the assessments of their violent attitudes.
The level of agreement in relation to general criminality was satisfactory and it was fair in relation to substance use problems. However, the assessors only agreed that general criminality had occurred in 13 percent of the cases (3/23) and that substance use problems existed in 22 percent of the cases (5/23).
The inter-rater agreement for the victim vulnerability factors was poor; there were no significant correlations in relation to any of these items and the percentage agreement scores were low overall. Compared to the analysis of PST-VC risk management, the level of agreement on recommended protective actions was higher in the B-SAFER risk management analysis. However, a closer examination of the pairwise assessments revealed that in a majority of the cases, information/support was the only recommended intervention.
To sum up the B-SAFER results, the inter-rater agreement for the global risk assessments were somewhat lower for the B-SAFER compared to the PST-VC. However, it was still good. The agreement for the offender risk factors was highest for violent threats and thoughts and for general criminality. Among the psychosocial adjustment items, the only significantly correlated factors were general criminality and substance use problems. The inter-rater agreement for the victim vulnerability factors was low and for the protective actions, it was fair. (Kropp, Hart, & Belfrage, 2005 . Note 2: *present= assessed according to the B-SAFER guidelines.
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DISCUSSION
The level of inter-rater agreement varied substantially for different types of factors in both samples. Overall, the assessors agreed regarding the global assessments, particularly when the percentage agreement was examined allowing for a one-step difference in the assessments. Even though one of the tools was a general violence risk assessment tool and the other was an IPV assessment tool, the overall results were similar. Sebire and Barling (2016) on the other hand, found a low consistency in police officers' summarized risk assessments. However, it is problematic to compare the results since the tools under study were different, as were the procedures of the evaluations. There was a high rate of missing values and a low inter-rater agreement for most of the risk-and vulnerability factors, which may be explained by two different shortcomings: lack of training and lack of access to information. The overall level of training regarding violence risk assessment, management and key risk/victim vulnerability factors, was low among the assessors. Some of them had not had any training in how to assess and manage violence risk, meaning they might not even know which factors to include in the PST-VC assessment, or how to assess such factors. The latter has also been found in a previous study. Belfrage (2008) found that police officers had difficulty assessing psychiatric risk factors in IPV cases; they chose to omit risk factors rather than including information that was uncertain. One way to improve the way these instruments are used in a police setting would thus be to provide a basic education with respect to personality and mental health factors: a recommendation that is justified by the fact that male offenders who commit lethal violence on a female intimate partner suffer from a psychiatric disorder in almost 90 percent of the cases 12 (Rying, 2007) . The level of omitted factors varies greatly in previous studies (from less than 1% in Storey et al. (2014) up to 39% in Belfrage (2008) ). We can only speculate on the reasons for the large differences. However, the level of omitted factors was reduced in Belfrage's (2008) study, after the assessors had received additional information on how to conduct the assessments. The assessors in the present study did not have any training related to the study, which may be one of the reasons to the large number of omitted factors in the study.
Storey, Gibas, Reeves and Hart (2011) evaluated a violence risk assessment training program for staff working in criminal justice settings, about 50 percent of whom were police officers. Overall, the results were promising, e.g. the participants' global risk assessments and recommended protective actions were more consistent with the experts' assessments when the training had been completed. They also improved their skills in identifying the presence of risk factors, and the level of agreement among the participants' assessments increased. On the negative side, the number of irrelevant risk factors included in the participants' assessments did not decrease after training and an even greater number of irrelevant protective actions were recommended in the assessments following training as compared to the situation prior to the training program. Aas (2014) highlights whether working with cases of domestic violence should be a specialty in Norwegian police settings, due to the complexity in such cases. The findings of the present study motivate consideration of the corresponding question, regarding the work with violence risk assessments in Swedish police settings. Should violence risk assessment be a task for police employees in general or a specialty for a dedicated group?
The lack of access to information noted in the current study was due to both case-specific factors and to factors that were common to all of the assessors. In one case, neither the police nor the victim had been able to identify the offender and in some other cases, the offender was unknown to the victim and this limited the level of access to information. Another case-specific factor relates to the victims' participation in the legal process. The victim is a key informant in risk assessments, which means that crucial information may be lost if the victim refuses to participate. Thus, the decision not to gather information for the B-SAFER assessments by speaking to victims probably contributed to the high rate of missing values and the low inter-rater agreement found in relation to those B-SAFER factors that could not be answered by only checking the police records/reports. The same explanation could probably be applied to the PST-VC results, since victims were not involved in the new assessments and rarely, as it seems, in the original assessments. The other reason to the lack of information was related to the lack of access to information regarding psychiatric risk factors among police employees in general (see Belfrage, 2008) .
The fact that the assessors did not use the structured variables in the risk assessment process leaves too much space for subjective judgements, which in previous research has shown to be associated with heuristics and biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . The researchers describe three different heuristics that people often use in doing such judgements: representativeness (comparisons with similar cases), availability (associations to instances close at hand) and adjustment and anchoring (adjustments from a starting point). Of these, primarily the first two can be linked to the violence risk assessments described in this study. For instance, the representativeness heuristic is used in classifying different cases to certain groups and the availability heuristics in assessing the probability of an event occurring. However, both representativeness and availability are affected by biases. E.g. in the use of representativeness, people seldom take the base-rate of the phenomenon under study into account and the base-rate is not related to the representativeness (called insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes by Tversky & Kahneman [1974 , p. 1124 ). In the case of subjective violence risk assessments this can be exemplified by an assessor's use of his/her professional experiences regarding similar cases/situations. Thus, a case that resembles a previous high-risk case may be assessed as high risk, without taking the base-rate of such cases into account.
The availability heuristics are associated with a kind of bias called illusory correlation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 , p. 1128 , which is described as the influence of our perceptions regarding the association between different events. If we consider two events to be closely linked, these will more often be assessed as co-occurring. In the context of violence risk assessments, illusory correlations between for instance offender or victim characteristics and the risk of repeat IPV could lead to incorrect judgements.
The fairly high reliability for the global risk assessments was most likely due to shared assumptions (heuristics, tacit knowledge) among the assessors rather than being based on the information obtained by the tools. One reason for this among the PST-VC assessors was probably that they meet occasionally to discuss and compare their risk assessments. Although one of the tools (B-SAFER) is commonly used by police forces within and out- side Europe the assessments seem to be flawed. Still, the actual assessments might nonetheless be relevant for risk predictions and selection of protective measures -an issue which we have not addressed in this study.
Limitations
A limitation of the study is that there were only three police employees conducting the B-SAFER assessments. To compensate for this, they assessed a relatively large number of cases. However, the results would of course have been more robust and possible to generalize with a larger number of assessors. Furthermore, the open structure of the PST-VC complicated the coding of risk-and victim vulnerability factors. If a factor was not mentioned, we do not know whether this was because the factor did not exist in the actual case (cf. "no" in the B-SAFER), or whether it was to be considered a missing value. Thus, the rate of missing values may appear to be larger than it actually was, as may the level of percentage agreement. This high rate of missing values constitutes the main limitation associated with the study, and it made a validation of the tools impossible. Additional evaluations are therefore needed of the inter-rater agreement for various violence risk assessment tools in police settings. However, despite the limitations, the study contributes to knowledge on how violence risk assessment and management works and what might be done in order to improve the methods.
Finally, one must keep in mind that prediction of human behavior is difficult. In order to identify "true" high-risk cases, many victims will be recommended protective actions unnecessarily. Their personal integrity will be limited and the society will be burdened monetarily.
To ensure the quality of future violence risk assessments and the effect of the subsequent protective actions, it is important to continue to follow up and evaluate this work.
